18 ideas
| 15647 | Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach] |
| 15649 | In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach] |
| 15648 | Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach] |
| 15655 | Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach] |
| 15654 | If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach] |
| 15650 | Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 15657 | To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach] |
| 15652 | We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach] |
| 15651 | Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach] |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 20883 | Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B] |
| 20884 | Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B] |
| 20885 | Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B] |
| 20882 | Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B] |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |